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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH ex rei GROVER 
A. GILES, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL FOR STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff, 
vs. 
T. E. BURKE, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF 
This is an action in the nature of a Quo Warranto 
brought by the State of Utah on the relation of Grover A. 
Giles, Attorney General, for the purpose of having the 
court declare and decree that the Defendant, T. E. Burke 
has forfeited the office of Justice of the Peace for the 
4th precinct of Magna, State of Utah; and to order the said 
T. E. Burke to surrender the official seal of said office and 
all the records and papers appertaining thereto. 
Section 104-66-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
provides: 
u.A civil action may be brought in the name of the 
state: 
**** 
(2) Against a public officer, civil or military, who 
does or suffers an act which by the provisions of law works 
a forfeiture of his office." 
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And section 104-66-4 reads: 
uThe Attorney General may, upon his own relation 
bring any such action, or he may, on leave of the court, 0; 
a judge thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the 
relation of another person; and if the action is brought 
under Section 104-66-1, he may require security for costs 
to be given as in other cases." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Title 10 3, Chapter 2 5, Section 1 of the Revised Stat-
utes of Utah, 19 3 3, provides: 
uE very person who deals or carries on, opens or 
causes to be opened, or who conducts, either as 
owner or employee, whether for hire or not, any 
game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge 
et noir, rondo, or any game played with cards, dice 
or any other device, for money, checks, credit or 
any other representative of value is guilty of a 
felony, and it shall be the duty of all sheriffs, con-
stables, police and other peace officers whenever it 
shall come to the knowledge of such officer that 
any person has in his possession any cards, tables, 
checks, balls, wheels, slot machines or gambling 
devices of any nature or kind whatsoever used or 
kept for the purpose of playing for money, or for 
tokens redeemable in money, at any of the games 
mentioned in this chapter, or that any cards, tables, 
checks, balls, wheels, slot machines or gambling 
devices used or kept for the purposes aforesaid may 
be found in any place, to seize and take such cards, 
tables, checks, bails, wheels, slot machines or other 
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gambling devices, and convey the same before a 
magistrate of the county in which such devices shall 
be found; and it shall be the duty of such magistrate 
to inquire of such witnesses as he shall summon or 
as may appear before him in that behalf touching 
the nature of such gambling devices, and, if such 
magistrate shall determine that the same are used 
or kept for the purpose of being used at any game or 
games of chance described in this chapter, it shall 
be his duty to destroy the same. 
On November 8, 1938, the said T. E. Burke, De-
fendant, was elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for 
the 4th precinct of Magna, Utah. On January 2, 1939 he 
qualified for said office and entered upon the duties thereof. 
On May 14, 1940, after legal committment by a county 
magistrate, said Defendant was charged by information 
with the crime of gambling under Title 103, Chapter 25, 
Section 1 R. S. U ., 19 3 3. In the Bill of Particulars the 
defendant was charged with having operated a gambling 
house known as ((Burke's Wonder land." 
On April 8, 1941, after legal trial said Defendant was 
found guilty of the crime charged. On April 12, 1941, 
said Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in 
the State Prison, State of Utah. On April14, 1941, Notice 
of Appeal, appealing said cause to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, was filed with the Clerk of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, and a certificate of prob-
able cause was signed by the trial judge, Honorable M. J. 
Bronson, and said cause is now pending upon appeal in 
said Supreme Court. Since his sentence by the Court, the 
Defendant has been released upon his own recognizance 
and has not been and is not now confined in the State Prison. 
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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 
In this Brief, plaintiff will present the following argu-
ments: 
1. A public officer convicted of a felony forfeits his 
office upon being sentenced to imprisonment in the State 
Prison, ipso facto, and a certificate of probable cause and an 
appeal from such conviction does not operate as a stay of 
execution insofar as the forfeiture of office is concerned. 
2. A conviction on a charge of operating a gambling 
house constitutes misconduct in office. 
3. The legislative intent and public policy governing 
forfeiture of public office. 
ARGUMENT NO. I 
A public officer convicted of a felony forfeits 
his office upon being sentenced to imprisonment in 
the State Prison, ipso facto, and a certificate of prob-
able cause and an appeal from such conviction does 
not operate as a stay of execution insofar as the 
forfeiture of office is concerned. 
Plaintiff contends that the defendant, T. E. Burke, 
forfeited his office by operation of law when he was con-
victed of a felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term 
in the State Prison, pursuant to Section 103-1-35, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 19 3 3 : 
'"'A sentence of imprisonment in the state prison 
for any term less than for life suspends all civil 
rights of the person so sentenced during such im· 
prisonment, and forfeits all private trusts and all 
public offices, authority or power." 
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( 1) Definition of uconvictian'-' .and Sentence. 
Conviction when used in its technical legal sense means 
the verdict of guilty, plus the judgment or sentence of the 
.. court upon such verdict. When used in this sense, convic-
tion is consummated when the court pronounces the sen-
tence or judgment, and the terms may be used interchange-
ably. 
Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 219, 
72 pac. (2d) 467; Smith vs. C<nn:monwealth of Va. 113 S. 
E. 707; Fau'n1ce vs. People, 51 Ill. 311; Singer vs. U. S., 
278 Fed. 415; 24 C. J. S., 17, Section 1556; 24 A. L. R. 1290. 
In Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission, supra, the 
·Court, on page 226, said: 
'The cases which -hold that a conviction in-
volves and requires also a sentence or judgment 
before it is a conviction are cases where a _more severe 
penalty is provided for a second offense." 
In Martin vs. State, 234 Pac. 795, 30 Okla. C. R. 49, 
the court quoting Gillmore vs. State, 108 Pac. 416, said: 
uln its ordinary sense the term 'conviction' is 
used to designate that particular stage of a criminal 
prosecution, when a plea of guilty is entered in open 
court or a verdict of guilty is returned by a jury. 
But in a strict legal sense, it denotes the final judg-
ment of the court, and imports the final consum-
mation of the prosecution, from the complaint to 
the judgment of the court by sentence." 
And, in State vs. Burnett, 258 Pac. 484, 144 Wash. 
598, the Court defined uconviction:" 
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uThe word «conviction' means a verdict or plea 
of guilty and an enforceable judgment rendered 
thereon in a court of competent jurisdiction." 
In 24 C. J. S., page 17, uconviction" in its technical 
legal sense is defined as follows: 
uln the restricted or te·chnicallegal sense in 
which it is sometimes used, conviction means the 
final consummation of the prosecution against the 
accused, including the judgment or sentence ren-
dered pursuant to a verdict, confession or plea of 
guilty. Frequently the term is used to denote the 
judgment or sentence itself, or to check both the 
ascertaining of the guilt of accused and· judgment 
thereon by the court. A judgment or sentence is 
indispensable to a conviction in this sense of the 
term, and the mere ascertainment of guilt by verdict 
or plea, which satisfies the ordinary legal definition 
of conviction, does not suffice." 
What is the meaning of the word usentence?" In 
uw ords and Phrases," Vol. 7, page 6411, usentence" is 
defined as follows: 
uThe sentence is the final determination of a 
criminal court; the pronouncement by the judge of 
the penalty or punishment as a consequence to the 
defendant of the fact of his guilt." uFeatherstone 
vs. People, 62 N. W. 684, 687, 194 Ill. 325." 
u (Sentence' as the term is used in criminal law, 
is the appropriate word to denote the action of the 
court before which the trial is had, declaring the 
consequences to the convict of the fact thus ascer-
tained. State vs. Barns, 4 So. 560, 561, 24 Fla. 153." 
HA sentence is a judgment of the court. Allen 
vs. Delaware County, 29 Atl. 288, 289, 161 Pa. 
550." 
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See u24 C. J. S. 15, Section 1556." 
Under Section 103-1-35, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, the defendant upon being sentenced by the court 
forfeited his office unless the appeal from the conviction 
stayed the execution of the judgment insofar as forfeiture 
of office is concerned. 
( 2) The affect of an appeal upon forfeiture of office. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, 
Section 12, safeguards certain rights to people accused of 
committing crimes. One such safeguard is the right to 
appeal from a conviction in the trial court. This right is 
further safeguarded under Section 105-40-9: 
uAn appeal to the supreme court from a judg-
ment of conviction stays the execution of the judg-
ment upon the :filing with the clerk of the court in 
which the conviction was had of a certificate of the 
judge of such court, or of a justice of the supreme 
court that in his opinion there is probable cause for 
the appeal, but not otherwise." 
The Constitutional right to appear is not infringed, 
however, by a legislative enactment that a public office is 
forfeited upon the sentence of imprisonment under Section 
1 0 3 -1-3 5 ; nor is Section 1 0 3 -1-3 5 in conflict with Section 
105-40-9. 
The appeal mentioned in the Constitution, Article I, 
Section 12, and in Section 105-40-9, is applicable to crimi-
nal proceedings and for the purpose of giving the accused 
every legal opportunity of proving his innocence; but~ such 
an appeal does not stay all of the consequences incident to 
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conviction. McKannay vs. Horton, 91 Pac. 598, 151 Cal. ¢1 
711; Hinson vs. Robbins, 14 Pac. (2d) 940, 159 Okla. 201; .~ 
lnre: Obergfell, 145 N. E. 323, (N.Y.); StateexrelBlake ~ 
vs. Levi, (W. Va.), 153 S. E. 587; Emmertson vs. State ;~ 
Tax Commission, supra, State ex rel Guthrie vs. Chap. 
man 60 Pac. {2d) 245, 187 Wn. 327; State vs. Frater 89 I 
Pac. {2d) 1046, 1048, 198 Wn. 675; 24 A. L. R. 1200; 106 1 
A. L. R. 640, 644. 
Thus, upon conviction the presumption of innocence 
shifts to a presumption of guilt, and the defendant has the 
burden of proving his innocence. State vs. Redman, (In-
diana) , 1 0 9 N. E. 18 4, 18 8. Likewise, if the accused cannot 
raise bail or is not released on his own recognizance he will 
be confined to jail pending the appeal, and in civil proceed-
ings, if an undertaking with sufficient surety is not given, 
pending the appeal, the prevailing party in the trial court 
may have execution on the judgment not withstanding the 
appeal; (Section 1 04-41-8) . These are examples of con-
sequences which are not stayed· by virtue of an appeal to a 
higher court. 
A forfeiture of office is a consequence flowing from 
the conviction or sentence of the accused and is not a part 
of the judgment; and not being a part of the judgment, the 
stay of execution and the certificate of probable cause has 
no effect on the forfeiture of office. McKannay vs. Horton, 
supra; Hinson vs. Robbins, supra; in re. Obergfell, supra; 
Emmertson vs. State Tax Contmission, supra; State vs. Fra-
ter, supra; State vs. Murphy, 148 S. W. (2d) 527, (Mis· 
souri); State vs. Levi, supra; 24 A. L. R. 1200; 106 A. L. R. 
644. 
In the case of McKannay vs. Horton, supra, the court 
was confronted with a case on all fours with the one under 
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:::.consideration here. In that case the mayor of San Francisco 
.. ·.had been convicted of a felony and appealed therefrom. 
~~ Pending his appeal he was incarcerated. He contended that 
.. 
"· 
his appeal: 
u• * * suspended the operation of the judgment for 
every purpose until the appeal which is still pending, 
shall be finally determined." 
t The court in that case said: 
uwe are clearly of the opinion that the statute 
will not bear that construction. An office becomes 
vacant when the incumbent is convicted of a felony, 
and also it becomes vacant when he is convicted of 
any offense-whether felony or misdemeanor-if 
it involves a violation of his official duties." 
Further on the court said: 
uNo man has a property right in an office para-
mount to the public interest. He has a property 
right in the salary and emoluments of an office while 
he is capable of discharging and actually discharges 
its duties; but when, by his fault or misfortune, he 
is no longer able to render the service, the public 
interests demand that he shall give way to some one 
who can. An official who is declared insane is simply 
unfortunate; but he ceases to be an official. An 
innocent man who is unjustly convicted of a felony 
is doubly unfortunate; but the fact that he may by 
means of an appeal ultimately succeed in establish-
ing his innocence does not entitle him in the mean-
time to hold on to a public office which he is no more 
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capable of serving than if he were insane. The law i 
allows an appeal from a conviction of felony be-
cause, so far from being against the public interest 
it is promotive of the public interest that a perso~ 
accuse~ of crll:ne ~ho~ld h~v.e every reasonable op-
portunity of vindicating hiS Innocence. But if, the 
person so convicted is the incumbent of a public 
office, these considerations do not weigh in favor 
of retaining him in that position pending an appeal. 
The pendency of the appeal does not affect the 
presumption of guilt, which arises immediately 
upon the rendition of the verdict; and it would be 
strange indeed if a state which gives such weight to 
that presumption as to deprive the defendant of the 
right to bail, and to require in all but rare and 
exceptional cases that he be detained in close custody 
in the common jail, should at the same time provide 
by law for his continuance in an office the duties of 
which he cannot discharge. There is no such law. 
The only effect of an appeal and certificate of 
probable cause is to stay the execution of the judg-
ment. Removal from office is not part of the judg-
ment of conviction in cases of felony, though a 
consequence which flows from it, and the statute in 
express terms defines and thereby limits the effect 
of the appeal and certificate of probable cause." 
And, in Hinson vs. Robbins, supra, page 941, under a 
statute which provided that: 
uEvery office shall become vacant on the hap-
. pening of either of the following events before the 
, expiration of the term of such office. * ~:- ~:-
uThird, whenever any judgment shall be .o~­
tained against him for a breach of his offtctal 
b d * * *" on . 
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The court held: 
uUpon the rendering of the judgment of 
December 17, 1930, adjudging that C. R. Hinson 
had breached his official bond, and rendering judg-
ment against him and his bondsmen, the office of 
county commissioner of district Number 1, held by 
C. -R. Hinson, became vacant by operation of law, 
ipso facto." 
Further, the court quotes, 29 Cyc. page 1401: 
. u.A vacancy in office, for any of the causes 
enumerated in the statute occurs usually at the time 
of the happening of the event whose occurrence is 
by the statute the cause of the vacancy, and no judi-
cial determination that a vacancy has occurred is 
necessary." 
And in re: Obergfell, supra, under a New York law 
providing: 
uEvery office shall be vacant upon the happen-
ing of either of the following events before the 
expiration of the term therof. ::· ::· *" 
u ( 5) His conviction of a felony, or a crime 
involving a violation of his oath of office. * ::· *" 
The court held that a forfeiture of office resulted upon 
the conviction of the mayor of Long Beach of the crime of 
grand larceny. The court succinctly stated the law as 
follows: 
uThe argument is made that the certificate of 
reasonable doubt, by staying the execution of the 
judgment, has stayed also the creation of a vacancy, 
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or, if a vacancy exists, the right to fill it. We read 
the statute otherwise. The abridgment of the term 
upon conviction of the incumbent is not a punish-
ment for his offense. Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 
81, 116 N. E. 782. It is an automatic limitation upon 
the duration of his office .. McKannay vs. Horton, 
151 Cal. 711, 91 P. 598, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 661, 
121 Am. St. Rep. 146. The application of the stat-
ute is not defeated by the possibility that the judg-
ment may be reversed. That possibility would be 
present though a certificate had not been granted 
and the incumbent were in jail. The statute does not 
mean that a vacancy shall exist in those cases, and 
those only, where the incumbent is subjected to 
physical restraint. Its meaning is that one convicted 
of a .felony shall not retain a post of honor. Mc-
Kannay vs. Horton, supra." 
It is interesting to note that the opinion in this case 
was Per Curiam by such outstanding legal minds as Hiscock, 
Cardozo, Pound, McLaughlin, Crane, Andrews and Leh-
man. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has recog-
nized that there are certain consequences flowing from 
a conviction which cannot be suspended by the court be-
cause they are incident to the conviction and not a part 
thereof. In Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission, supra, 
in discussing the effect of a statute requiring the revocation 
by the State Tax Commission of the driver's license of one 
convicted of certain traffic violations, the court said, on 
page 225: 
ult is evident therefore that the revoking of 
the license is mandatory on the commission upon 
receipt of a record of the conviction, and is not 
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founded upon any order or judgment of the court. 
The court may suspend execution of any judgment 
or sentence it imposes upon one convicted, but the 
revocation of the license still takes effect. The court 
cannot suspend that result of conviction because 
it is no part of the court's judgment; it is a result 
imposed by law mandatorily." 
~. It is clear that, under the interpretation of forfeiture 
~;:, of office in the adjudicated cases, when an office holder is 
:~~ convicted of a felony or, as under the Utah Statute, is 
.~: sentenced to the State Prison for a felony, the forfeiture of 
·~·- office is by operation of law and takes effect, ipso facto, with 
==~ the sentence of the court. That such a forfeiture is no part 
·- of the court's judgment, but is an incident to such judg-
ment and is not stayed by a certificate of probable cause 
and an appeal thereunder is also the adjudicated law. 
ARGUMENT NUMBER II 
A conviction on a charge of operating a gam-
bling house constitutes misconduct in office. 
Section 103-1-17, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
provides as follows: 
uThe conviction of any state, county, city, 
town, or precinct officer of a felony involving mis-
conduct in office involves as a consequence, in 
addition to the punishment prescribed by law, a 
forfeiture of his office, and disqualifies him ever 
afterwards from holding any public office in this 
state." 
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The definition of the term uconviction" as used in 
connection with forfeiture of office and the effect of an 
appeal from a conviction involving as an incident to such 
conviction a forfeiture of office is discussed in Argument 
Number 1. 
In this argument, plaintiff will endeavor to show that 
the operating of a gambling house by a justice of the peace 
(the charge upon which defendant Burke was convicted as 
particularized in the Bill of Particulars, which is a part of 
plaintiff's Complaint) involves misconduct in office. 
Misconduct in office as defined in 46 C. J. 987, Section 
151, is: 
uThe phrase (wilfull misconduct' is broad 
enough to include any wilfull malfeasance, mis-
feasance, or nonfeasance in office. The word 
cwilfull' is used in the sense of a conscious and 
intentional failure or refusal to perform or keep 
inviolate any duty imposed upon the officer by law; 
not every technical violation of the statute, or of an 
official duty will justify a removal. An officer may 
be removed under such a statute, although the act 
alleged to constitute the wilful misconduct charged 
falls short of the commission of the crime. Wilfull 
neglect of official duties may be either an act of 
omission or commission, but the act or omission 
must have been for a bad purpose, or when the 
officer conscientiously acts or omits to act contrary 
to a known duty. To constitute a ground for a sum-
mary removal of a public officer for cwilfull miscon-
duct or maladministration in office,' the acts and 
conduct thereof must have been wilful and such 
as to amount to maladministration in office." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
And,inEtzlervs. Brown, 50 So. 516,517,58 Fla. 221, 
~~138 Am. St. Rep. 113, it is stated: 
((Malconduct in office, like misconduct in 
office includes such acts as amount to a breach of 
the ~ood faith and right actions that are tacitly 
required of all officers.'' 
• For other definitions see 27 Words and Phrases, Perm. 
·. Ed., 316, 317. 
The operation of a gambling house and its inevitable 
.. inducement to gamble, or the permitting of gambling by a 
public officer, is misconduct in office. In re: Carpenter, 
50 N.Y. S. R. 631, 21 N.Y. Supp., 3 51; State vs. Frater, 
supra; State vs. Williams, 144 S. W. (2d) 98 (Mo.); State 
vs. Graves, 144 S. W. (2d) 91 (Mo.). 
~ In the case of State vs. Frater, supra, the mayor of the 
:~ City of Bremerton, Washington, was convicted of the crime 
:: of conspiracy to establish and operate gambling games and 
:~ devices, and was sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed 
· his conviction to the Supreme Court of that state. Quo 
~ warranto proceedings were instituted in which the facts 
: relative to the trial, conviction and sentence were set forth. 
~ The mayor, in defense to the quo warranto proceedings, 
alleged that the offense of which he was charged was not 
: malfeasance in office, that it did not involve a violation of 
his official oath, and that his conviction was not final, 
since he had appealed to the Supreme Court. The court 
ruled against him on each allegation. 
In holding that his conviction of the crime of con-
spiracy to violate the gambling laws of the State consti-
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tuted a malfeasance in office, the court said, page 1047, 
1048: 
uRelator contends that his conviction of the 
crime of conspiracy to violate the gambling laws 
of this state does not constitute malfeasance in 
office in that the crime of which he was convicted 
did not affect the performance on his part of the 
duties of mayor. He cites State ex rei. Martin vs. 
Burnquist, 141 Minn. 308, 170 N. W. 201, 609; 
Mechem on Public Officers, 290, 457, and Throop 
on Public Officers, 3 6 3, 3 67, and other cases of like 
import; all of which support the following rule 
announced in the last mentioned authority: cWhere 
the constitution or a statute authorizes a removal 
for official misconduct, or misfeasanceJ misconduct, 
or maladministration in office, or Similar acts of 
misbehavior in office, the general rule is, that the 
officer can be removed only for acts or omissions 
relating to the performance of his official duties, not 
for those which affect his general moral character, 
or his conduct as a man of business, apart from his 
conduct as an officer. In such a case, as a learned 
judge has remarked, it is necessary cto separate the 
character of the man from the character of the 
officer.' 
uAdmitting the force of the rule contained 
in the citations, we are· of the opinion that relator 
did violate a duty of his office when he conspired to 
introduce and protect gambling in the city of 
Bremerton and to dissuade the prosecuting attorney 
of ·Kitsap ·County from discharging the legally 
prescribed duties of his office. . 
uThis conspiracy was of such a nature that 1ts 
radius was not confined to the sphere and domain o.f 
relator's personal and private life, but invaded h1s 
official life, and rendered impossible the faithful 
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discharge of his official duties in accordance with 
his oath of office. 
~I ((Relator as mayor was superintendent of the 
department of public safety (Rem. Rev. Stat. 9101) 
and official head of the city government. It was 
his official and sworn duty to compel obedience to 
the ordinances of his city and the statutes of his 
state. When he conspired to introduce gambling in 
the city, he violated the principal and most im-
portant duty of the high office to which he had 
been elected by his fellow citizens. He was clearly 
guilty of malfeasance in office as that term is used 
in our constitution and statutes." 
1t: 
... 
... 
.... 
.. ..; 
~r The defendant Burke, while wearing the cloak of 
: authority as magistrate of the Magna Precinct, not only 
~. had actual notice of the commission of a felony but par-
·;: ticipated in the commission of that offense according to 
~: the verdict of the court at his trial. 
Section 105-11-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 193 3, 
~- reads: 
,. 
,. 
uEvery person who has reason to believe that 
a crime or public offense has been committed must 
make complaint against such person before some 
magistrate having authority to make inquiry of the 
same." 
Under the foregoing provisions, it would have been 
Mr. Burke's duty, in his capacity as a citizen, to make 
complaint against those committing the gambling offense 
in his presence. How much higher was his duty when 
, cloaked with the authority of a magistrate under the laws 
of this State to cause a complaint to be made against his 
associates. Burke had a plain duty as a magistrate of the 
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Magna Precinct to cause the arrest of those participating 
in the gambling after full knowledge that a felony was 
being committed in his presence. To be the proprietor of 
a gambling house makes him a person unfit to hold public 
office. It is difficult to imagine a case in which a more 
corrupt or evil design or purpose is manifest from the acts 
of the defendant so as to render him unfit to hold public 
office. His conviction places him squarely within the law 
as laid down in State ex rel. Hart vs. Common Counsel of 
City of Duluth, 55 N. W. 118, 120: 
u* ::· * The cause [for removal] must be one 
touching the qualifications of the officer or his per-
formance of its duties, showing that he is not a fit or 
proper person to hold the office." 
ARGUMENT NO. III 
The Legislative intent and Public Policy regard· 
ing forfeiture of office. 
Let us now examine the intent of the Legislature of 
this State regarding the forfeiture of public office. The 
Legislature has provided that an appeal from a judgment of 
ouster in a quo warranto proceeding should not stay the 
execution of the judgment of ouster. Under the chapter 
dealing with appeals, Section 104-41-17, it is provided: 
uwhere the defendant is adjudged guilty of 
usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding 
public office, civil or military, within this state, the 
execution of the judgment shall not be stayed by 
an appeal. Where the judgment appealed from dt-
rects the sale of perishable property and proceedings 
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are stayed, the court may order the property to be 
sold and the proceeds thereof to be deposited, to 
abide the judgment of the appellate court." 
~ In Section 105-7-14, dealing with removal by ju-
~ dicial proceedings, the Legislature has provided: 
((From a judgment of removal an appeal may 
be taken to the supreme court in the same manner 
as from a judgment in a civil action; b_ut until such 
judgment is reversed the defendant shall be suspend-
ed from his office. Pending the appeal the office 
must be filled as in case of a vacancy." 
From the sections last above quoted, it is apparent that 
the Legislature intended that one, under the approbrious 
epithet of a convict or felon, should not be entitled 
to act in a public office. This court has recognized that 
. intention. In the course of its opinion in State ex rel. Kay 
vs. Dranney, 57 Utah 14, 19, 176 Pac. 767, the court stated: 
((Section 3 315 of our code, [now Section 104-
41-17] immediately succeeding Section 3314, [now 
Section 1 04-41-16], provides that in the case of one 
adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into, of 
unlawfully holding public office, civil or military, 
the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed 
by an appeal. That provision was evidently in-
tended by the Legislature to make an exception in 
favor of a judgment ousting public officers, civil 
or military, by providing that such judgment should 
not be stayed; ~· * * " 
The ouster from office by quo warranto is a civil not a 
criminal proceeding in Utah as well as in most jurisdictions. 
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Skeen vs. Craig 31 Utah 20, 86 Pac. 487; Burke vs. Knox 
59 Utah 596, 600, 206 Pac. 711. In State ex rel. Lloyd vs. 
Elliott, 13 Utah 200, 44 Pac. 248, the court after reviewing 
the historical development of the writ of quo warranto 
said; at page 205: 
u* * * The information is criminal in form 
but, in substance, it has long since been regardel 
as a civil proceeding for the correction of the usur-
pation, nonuser or misuser of a public office or cor-
porate· franchise; and as now employed, both in 
England and America, its object is substantially the 
same as that of the ancient writ of quo warranto. 
* ~· * " (Italics ours) 
Among the other jurisdictions which hold that an 
action in the nature of a quo warranto is a civil proceeding 
are: Missouri (State ex rel. Brison vs. Lingo, 26 N. W. 496); 
California (People vs. Dashaway Ass'n, 24 Pac. 277, 84 
Cal. 114); Florida (State vs. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190); Rhode 
Island (State vs. Kearn, 22 Atl. 1018, 17 R.I. 391); Wis-
consin (State ex rel. Atty·. Gen. vs. Norcross, 112 N. W. 40~ 
132 Wis. 534); Alabama (State ex rel. Goodgame vs. 
Matthews, 153 Ala. 646, 45 So. 307); Oklahoma (Maben 
vs. Rosser, 103 Pac. 674, 24 Okla. 588); New Mexico 
(Territory vs. Sanches, 94 Pac. 954); See 51 C. J. 312, 
Sec. 7; 81 A. L. R. 1094. 
Since the action of quo warranto is not in substance 
criminal, it follows, a fortiori, that a forfeiture of office 
by operation of law is not criminal. The purpose of the 
action of quo warranto to remove one from office and 
a quo warranto proceeding to have declared a forfeiture 
of office by operation of law accomplish the same purpose. 
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:· In the former, the action is to oust defendant from office; 
. while the latter, which is the proceedings in this case, is to 
<·have the court declare the office vacant by recognizing 
:~·judicially a fait accompli and oust the wrongdoer from 
enjoying the privileges and benefits of an office which he 
no longer possesses. State vs. Murphy, supra, at page 53 0. 
It would seem to follow that the Constitutional right to 
appeal in criminal cases is not abridged by declaring that 
an appeal from a conviction does not stay a forfeiture of 
:office, particularly in view of the fact that the forfeiture 
.,_ is incident to the conviction and not a part thereof. 
. The defendant may argue that to suffer a forfeiture 
· of office upon sentence or conviction will do him irreparable 
harm in the event such conviction or sentence is reversed 
_ on appeal. That this would be unfortunate, plaintiff 
., concedes. However, it is plaintiff's contention that public 
~ policy dictates that one, under the odium of a felony, should 
not be permitted to hold a public office. A public office is a 
public trust and one has no property rights in a public 
office. Fellows, Attorney General, ex rel. Cummings vs . 
. Eastman, 136 Atl. 810; Taylorvs. Beckhan~, 178 U.S. 548, 
477; McKannay vs. Horton, supra. 
The public policy in regard to this matter was stated 
in State ex rel. Blake vs. Levi, supra, page 58 8, (W. Va.) : 
uThe robe of innocence with which the law 
invested Mr. Camp during trial was stripped from 
him by the verdict of the jury. The judgment of 
the court has put upon him the garb of guilt. A 
legal, as well as a laical presumption has arisen that 
his conviction is just. Jones Commentary on Evi-
dence (1st Ed.) Section 12D; 2 Bishops New Crim-
inal Procedure (2nd Ed.) Section 11 0 3. ~· :~ ~· 
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"It is essential to our Government that public I; 
officials. have the confidence of the people. That 
confidence cannot extend to an official under con- 1 
viction for malfeasance in office. His rights are 
subordinate to the public weal. The possibility that ·' 
a conviction may be ultimately reversed cannot 
weigh against public dissatisfaction with, and pub-
lic mistrust of him pending appellate hearing. Pub-
lic policy demands a rigid construction of this law 
as well as its rigid enforcement. With pitiless 
propriety, the Supreme Court of Virginia said: 
(That when the people established the Constitution 
they never intended that a public office should be 
contaminated by the presence of a convicted*** 
felon.' Commonwealth vs. Fugate, supra, page 726 
of 2 Leigh, ( 29 V a.) . Under enactments similar 
to ours, the Supreme Court of California held: tlf 
a public officer is convicted of a felony and sen-
tenced upon such conviction, the effect of the judg-
ment as terminating his ti tie to the office is not 
avoided by his prosecuting an appeal and obtaining 
from the trial judge a certificate of probable cause.' 
McKannay vs. Horton, 151 Cal. 711, 91 P. 598, 
13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661, 121 Am. St. Rep. 146. 
uw e according! y hold that under the Constitu-
tion the conviction of Mr. Camp vacated his office. 
Under Code, c, 45, No. 32, it then became the duty 
of the presidents of the several boards of educatio~ 
of Kanawha County to appoint his successor. Thts 
duty they have failed to perform. Therefore the 
peremptory writ will issue." 
See also State ex rel. Gutherie vs. Chapman 60 P (2nd) 
245, 187 Wash. 327; 106 A. L. R. 640. 
The court should consider also that if one is permitted 
to act in a public office after he has been convicted and 
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:_ sentenced for the commission of a felony, and during the 
, pendency of the appeal, he perform official acts-for ex-
:ample if the defendant T. E. Burke, were to continue to 
,hear cases and pass sentences in criminal proceedings and 
--judgments in civil proceedings-what would be the legal 
, status of those performances if the conviction is ultimately 
.:.:affirmed by the Supreme Court? It is submitted that such 
~ acts would be without authority of law and null and void 
- since he would be a felon at the time of the performance 
~of the acts and a felon cannot hold public office. We 
. submit that it would be an anomalous situation and a legal 
- quirk or caprice if an appeal after a conviction and sen-
: tence for the commission of a felony worked a stay of exe-
: cution of the forfeiture of public office while an appeal 
~ from an ouster in a quo warranto proceeding did not 
__ operate as such a stay. Certainly the Legislature did not 
: intend and did not enact such an anomaly. 
CONCLUSION 
In this brief plaintiff has shown that a conviction in 
its strict legal sense and sentence or judgment are synon-
omous terms and may be used interchangeably. We have 
demonstrated that an appeal from a conviction of a felony 
and sentence of judgment does not stay the execution of 
the judgment insofar as the forfeiture of public office is 
concerned. That, since the forfeiture of office is incidental 
to, and not a part of the judgment, it does not abridge the 
constitutional right of appeal. That the operating of a 
gambling house, by a public officer is misconduct in office. 
We have submitted that public policy necessitates the for-
feiture of office when the officeholder is convicted of a 
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felony and sentenced to imprisonment, and that the legis .. 
lature has recognized and affirmed this policy in its enact-
ments. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General. 
H. F. SMART, 
A. JOHN BRENNAN, 
Assistant Attorneys General. 
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